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DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT 
By James Roumasset 
 
 
The paper addresses the nature and locus of appropriate government control in the 
provision of collective services. It suggests some useful principles for determining organizational 
structures with the appropriate degree and form of decentralization, which is seen to be an 
important part of incentive compatibility. In the case of low-income housing, it cites the 
privatization of sites and services and the evolution of upgrading as two promising models be 
decentralization. 
 
1. 
 
Conventional public finance theory has been commonly invoked to' rationalize 
government intervention in the face of externalities and public goods. More recently, critics of 
inefficiencies in public-provided goods and services have begun to speak of government and 
bureaucratic failures as well. These critiques have led to widespread calls for privatization and 
"getting the prices right."  
 
Advocacy of "privatization," narrowly defined as divestiture, however, tends to promote 
the mistaken view that the only way to avoid government inefficiencies is by replacing 
government provision with the private sector. The narrow privatization view tends to ignore the 
raison d'etre of public goods. In an attempt to accommodate a minimum role of government, 
Clarkson (1988) defines privatization more broadly to include contracting out, franchise 
agreements, grants and subsidies, vouchers, volunteers, self-help incentives, user fees, and 
service shedding. This definition is so broad however as to be of limited operational value.  
 
In this paper, I take the view that the public versus private provision controversy does not 
provide much guidance in the provision of collective services. Rather the problem addressed is 
the nature and locus of appropriate government control. The issue is not so much who should 
provide a service but how to design a governance structure so that individual incentives are 
aligned with a collective objective. Decentralization is seen to be an important part of incentive 
compatibility. Like "privatization," however, "decentralization" as a politically expedient slogan 
is of little value in providing operational guidelines for the reform of public institutions. In what 
follows, I attempt to suggest some useful principles of determining organizational structures with 
the appropriate degree and form of decentralization. 
 
 
2. 
 
 
According to the conventional wisdom, competitive markets constitute a decentralized 
mechanism for the alignment of individual incentives with the social objective of efficiency. 
Decentralized provision of public goods is generally held to be impossible because of the 
inherent characteristic of nonexcludability. Since no one can be excluded, each is thought to seek 
a "free ride" or at least a "cheap ride." 
 
In the new "incentive compatibility" literature (e.g. Groves and Ledyard), it can be shown 
that under simplifying behavioral assumptions it is possible to design a program where 
individuals have incentives for honest preference revelation, i.e., that decentralized mechanisms 
for optimal public good provision are possible. Later work however has shown that these early 
results are not robust. Drawing on the contributions of Hurwicz and Roberts, Smith (1980) has 
concluded that 
 
"depending on what one assumes about the strategic behavioral modes of economic 
agents, the attainment of optimal resource allocation by decentralized pricing systems 
may be either possible or impossible, but in their case this result does not depend on 
whether goods are private or public." 
 
This statement provides a sort of "generalized impossibility theorem" for noncooperative 
games. It is not possible to find an incentive compatible decentralized mechanisms for the 
efficient coordination of individual action under a broad range of admissible types of strategic 
behavior. In other words, theoretical explorations in the realm of noncooperative game theory 
can be summarized by the proposition that "nothing always works." 
 
At the other end of the analytical spectrum, under zero transaction costs an infinite 
number of socially efficient cooperative solutions can be found ranging from purely centralized 
to purely decentralized. That is, where transaction costs of both decentralized and centralized 
solutions are assumed to be zero, "everything works."  
 
The upshot of all this is clear. As Coase, Demsetz, Arrow and many others have been 
saying for years, it is not analytically rational to attempt the design of public policy informed by 
models that assume either that no extra-market contracting is possible or that there are no 
impediments to contracting. Rather, the transaction cost structure of various cooperative 
mechanisms must be explicitly recognized. 
 
The general normative problem of public policy, then, is how to design organizational 
structures that align individual incentives to social objectives. A useful conceptual framework for 
making normative (or explanatory) comparisons among organizational forms is the agency 
theory (Williamson, 1985; Roumasset, 1988). Agency theory allows one to aggregate the' 
organizational costs and the costs of any remaining disincentives associated with imperfect 
incentive alignment. The performance of alternative organizations can then be compared 
according to the aggregate measure, defined as agency costs.  
 
Without using the same terminology, Arrow (1964) has suggested for example that 
agency costs are minimized by a combination of "top-down" and "bottom-up" control instead of 
either completely decentralized or completely centralized forms. This proposition can be useful 
if applied to the problem of allocating water in an irrigation system. The problem with centrally 
determined water allocations is that this central authority will have difficulties in obtaining and 
processing accurate information about water productivities at alternative points in the system. On 
the other hand, systems that attempt to respond to the articulated demands of users may have 
difficulty in reconciling those demands with limited supply. In the face of rapidly changing 
demands, inefficiencies due to the "wrong" rationing rule or price may be even greater than the 
efficiencies of a centrally directed system.  
 
A more efficient system can be fashioned by combining topdown allocation of water 
rights with institutions that facilitate exchange. Water "markets" can be established for the 
exchange of water rights within various sections of the irrigation system. The market clearing 
price in each section would then provide a signal to central administrators who periodically 
reallocate water rights among sections. 
 
An interrelated problem concerns the optimal degree of control in an organization. In the 
centralized, decentralized and hybrid organizations just described, there was an implicit 
assumption of central enforcement of rights and responsibilities of individual actors in the 
system. Since neither zero nor perfect enforcement is likely to be efficient, one may presume that 
there is some internal 'optimum level of enforcement. 
 
Figure 1 provides a framework for the determination of the optimal degree of 
administrative control. Curve CC measures the administrative costs of control and related 
functions of monitoring and information. Curve SAI measures the cost of imperfect spatial 
allocation of water at different levels of control and information costs, C. The sum of CC and 
SAI gives the total agency cost, which is minimized at the optimum control point C*. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each institutional characteristic are influenced by conditions of 
the local physical and economic environment in which the irrigation system operates. For 
example, conditions of relative water scarcity may increase the gap between water supplies and 
demand and increase benefits from water management. With water scarcity, the gap between 
water supplies and demand grows and coordination functions of management activities become 
more important. In terms of Figure 1, this suggests that C* increases with water scarcity. 
 
 
 
 Consideration of the optimal degree of centralization and control implies a bilateral 
relationship between economic agents and a governing body. More generally the problem of 
incentive compatible organization of government services involves multilateral relationships and 
is sometimes referred to as "the architecture of economic systems" (Stiglitz, 1987). The incentive 
design problem in hierarchical and other multilateral systems is to motivate various parties to a 
cooperative arrangement to pursue their comparative advantage so as to maximize their 
contribution to the group. 
 
The key tool in the efficient organization of local public services is financial 
management. The first task of effective financial management is to clarify and maintain an 
efficient division of responsibility. The central governance structure for aligning performance 
with prescribed responsibility is reciprocal accountability between the providing organization 
and the user. In the case of water delivery, this can be effected by a system of billing and 
collection wherein the user loses service if he doesn't pay (or meet other responsibilities) and the 
provider does not receive full payment if services are substandard.  
 
Financial management is also the 'key tool to minimize unproductive rent-seeking. 
Heavily subsidized irrigation systems and other services are characterized by an "iron triangle" 
of beneficiaries. Bureaucrats politicians, and special interests (e.g., contractors and farmers) all 
perceive themselves as gaining from the subsidies. Because of the inefficient design, 
construction, operation and maintenance promoted under the rent-seeking regime, however, 
transfers to the triangle of beneficiaries are short-lived and exceeded by transfers away from 
taxpayers (Repetto, 1986). 
 
As Wicksell emphasized, the primary check against rent-seeking is benefit taxation. In 
practice, benefit taxation is often not viable due to the presence of a large number of hard-to-
identify indirect beneficiaries. This problem can be solved by taxing direct beneficiaries 
according to their share of total benefits and financing indirect benefits through indirect taxation 
or from general revenue (Roumasset, 1987). 
 
By making the water authority responsible for paying a certain percentage of costs and 
giving them the authority to collect those costs from the farmers through charges based on the 
value of water received, the pork-barrel mechanism of irrigation investment is thwarted. Whether 
the authority is a utility or is directly controlled by the beneficiaries, it will be motivated to 
maximize the benefits of a given structure and to avoid unnecessary expenditures. Farmers will 
likewise be motivated to pay, in order to avoid losing the benefits of irrigation. 
 
An idealized irrigation system is illustrated in Figure 2 based on the following principles: 
 
1. Financial responsibility - The irrigation authority is responsible for repaying the costs 
of the irrigation system and the farmer beneficiaries are responsible for paying the 
irrigation authority. 
 
2. Decentralization - Each function is carried out by the smallest efficient unit. Thus one 
irrigation authority is organized for each major irrigation system. Only technical 
assistance, subsidies, and regulation are to be administered at a higher level of 
government. 
 
3. Pareto safety - Farmers are not coerced to pay for a system whose' costs exceed the 
benefits. This can be assured through political representation in the water authority or 
through voluntary subscription to the irrigation service.  
 
 
 
The appropriate degree of control vested in the water authority(relative to the central 
regulatory body and to the users) depends on a number of technical, social, and political 
parameters. The extent to which a water users association can take over a number of 
management tasks depends, for example, on social determinants of successful collective action 
and on the external political and legal environment. 
 
The general analytical problem of optimal centralization of a water authority is much the 
same as the well-known problem of optimal separation of ownership and control in the industrial 
organization literature. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) and many others have pointed out, 
delegating specific management tasks increases specialization without any necessary loss of 
critical control functions and cannot be judged on a priori grounds to be inefficient. Similarly a 
water authority may retain ultimate responsibility for operation and maintenance and still 
delegate most of the specific managerial tasks to the water users' association. Whether we are 
discussing a corporate board of directors or a public water district, the body with responsibility 
for providing the service should retain residual control over the executing agent, e.g., the water 
users' association remains accountable to the water district. Thus, if the water authority retains 
responsibility for irrigation services, it must also retain some monitoring and control functions. 
This means that the water authority must be able to impose sanctions on the user association for 
noncompliance and ultimately to withdraw some of the managerial functions that it has granted. 
Where preconditions favor full responsibility and control being eventually vested in the farmers, 
it may be appropriate to build in a schedule for decontrol as part of the irrigation project design. 
This could include a deadline, for example, for the full operation and maintenance responsibility 
of an irrigation system to be turned over to a federation of the user associations operating the 
different sections of an irrigation system.  
 
 
3. 
 
In this section I attempt to state principles and guidelines for the appropriately 
decentralized provision of low-income housing. The first step is to articulate the rationale for 
public provision and to describe the first-best solution. 
 
The main reason for public involvement in low-income housing is that housing is a basic 
need. The Philippine Government, for example, has a constitutional mandate to "establish, 
maintain, and ensure adequate social services in the field of housing ... to guarantee enjoyment 
by the people of a decent standard of living" (Angeles, 1985). As Harberger (1978) has noted, 
basic needs are most clearly represented as consumption externalities. Where many citizens have 
a willingness-to-pay for improved low-income housing, an efficient quantity and subsidy for 
low-income housing can be determined using the Lindahl equilibrium. The Lindahl solution can 
be implemented as a voucher where the voucher price to the recipient is given by the intersection 
of the beneficiaries' demand curve and the socially efficient quantity of housing for the 
beneficiary. The difference between the voucher price (beneficiary charge) and the face value of 
the voucher is the housing subsidy. 
 
The Lindahl voucher can be used to accommodate other housing-related externalities as 
well. Poor maintenance of one house affects the property and rental value of neighboring houses, 
an externality that is exacerbated by fixed-lease tenancy and referred to as the "slumlord's 
dilemma." The appearance of slums may lower the aesthetic welfare of passersby and, if slums 
contribute to criminal activity, "neighborhood effects" of slums may be more serious (see e.g., 
Weicher, 1979). These problems are all consumption externalities and are logically included in 
the Lindahl solution. 
 
The Lindahl solution provides a first-best alternative to centralized provision. The 
centralized solution has been justly criticized for high costs and low number of beneficiaries. 
Slum "improvement" often involves eviction of illegal squatters and slum clearance thereby 
making those who perhaps should be targeted as beneficiaries decidedly worse off (see also 
Swan, Wegelin, and Panchee, 1983). 
 
The high subsidies inherent in the centralized solution also breed rent-seeking. The 
centralized system can be captured by an iron triangle of politicians, bureaucrats, and special 
interests (contractors and pork-barrel beneficiaries). Politicians increase their power through the 
contributions given by contractors and by extending patronage to the housing beneficiaries. 
Contractors get non-competitive contracts with loose auditing mechanisms that allow them to 
obtain high profit margins. Due to excess demand for subsidized housing, the beneficiaries are 
"part of the deal" and tolerate substandard construction and ancillary services. The bureaucrats 
are commonly allied with the politicians and get either promotions or increased budgets as their 
part of the bargain. 
 
The objective of decentralization and incentive realignment then can be thought of as 
simultaneously implementing a solution close to the Lindahl equilibrium and removing the 
incentives for rent-seeking. As both Wicksell and Lindahl understood, rent-seeking can be 
avoided by benefit taxation (it was only later authors who compared benefit taxation to various 
measures of ability to pay according to equity). The beneficiaries can be defined according to the 
Lindahl solution. The share of costs to be paid by the direct beneficiaries is given by the 
beneficiaries' demand relative to aggregate demand including the value of the consumption 
externalities. Administrative costs aside, tax instruments should also be designed to tax the 
indirect beneficiaries. To the extent that the indirect beneficiaries can be roughly identified with 
the tax paying population and given that direct taxation of the indirect beneficiaries is 
administratively costly, the subsidies portion of low income housing may be financed out of 
general taxation.  
 
Construction and provision of housing services can be modeled as in Figure 2. Two 
possible approaches are outlined here. The first approach to be described corresponds to one of 
Rondinelli's four categories of decentralization called privatization. In this particular variant of 
privatization, the government acts as facilitator in ensuring that the basic "sites and services" are 
provided. In this approach developers play the key roles in design, construction and the sale. The 
government provides the appropriate subsidy, may help in arranging zoning, and provides 
minimum standards and specifications and the corresponding auditing mechanisms. 
 
The second method of decentralization to be discussed falls under Rondinelli's category 
of "devolution." As noted in Reyes (1988), this approach is especially relevant to upgrading the 
quality of housing in target areas. The World Bank approach to upgrading focuses on minimum 
relocation of housing in the target area in order to upgrade the basic services, especially water, 
sewage, and electricity. Local governments are the focal points of these efforts.  
 
Under central government provision, the government budget for a particular locality is 
not closely linked with either the demands or the needs of that locality. Moreover, beneficiaries 
are apt to feel isolated from the central government and to feel a correspondingly lower sense of 
responsibility about repayment. 
 
Local government accommodates these concerns and provides reciprocal accountability 
between provider and recipient. Mechanisms can be designed so that the local government 
housing authority is made accountable to direct and indirect beneficiaries via voting and 
regulation from the national housing authority. In addition, incentives are needed so that the local 
government is rewarded for responsible provision and penalized for substandard provision, 
maintenance and management. Direct beneficiaries can be made accountable for payment of 
their assessed share of the costs simply by cutting off services to delinquents. 
 
That is, the "publicness" of low income housing lies in the consumption externalities and 
the economies of scale involved in production and provision. Excludability is still a viable 
instrument of enforcement for the direct beneficiaries.  
 
As Radner suggests, it is not how much but how to decentralize that is the meaningful 
question. The privatization of sites and services and the devolution of upgrading provide two 
promising models of decentralization. Under what economic and political environments these 
arrangements have large or small advantages is a subject for further investigation. The agency 
theory approach discussed above provides a promising framework for such evaluations. 
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